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Summary
We analyze the dynamic behaviour of firms that locally interact through price competition in a social
environment in an evolutionary game-theoretic model. These firms update their prices according to
the behavioural rule ‘Win Cooperate, Lose Defect’ ~WCLD!, which is often observed in experimental
economics. It can be regarded as a generalized Tit-for-Tat strategy. The model can explain the simul-
taneous emergence of collusive behaviour, price dispersion and occasional local price wars. Price wars
only last for a short period of time after which the firms start to collude again.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In many industries it is typical for firms ~or shops! to compete directly with neigh-
bouring firms and only indirectly with the other firms in the market. Literal ex-
amples are gasoline stations and bakery stores that compete locally for customers
who live nearby but do not compete for customers that live far away. Or, in terms
of horizontal competition, Bordeaux vineyards compete among each other for con-
sumers who prefer Bordeaux wines but they compete less with vineyards from
the Rhone valley or the Elzas. So, wine producers compete for niches with a
certain taste characteristic and their closest competitors are those that offer an
almost identical flavour. Heineken, Amstel, Oranje Boom, and Grolsch compete
with different flavours of beer on the same Dutch beer market. Another example
is telephone and internet companies which offer a wide range of tariffs, connec-
tions, and service menus to their costumers. In terms of horizontal competition
‘neighbouring’ means competing products that are relatively close in some ab-
stract product space. As a consequence, the own price and the neighbouring prices
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matter in attracting customers. This paper focuses on competition between prod-
ucts with horizontal characteristics in a local interaction model.
For explanatory reasons we choose competition among Dutch gasoline stations
as the leading example of local interaction. The Dutch gasoline market does not
exhibit a uniform market price for gasoline, but instead there is price dispersion.
It is well known that the price near the Belgium and German borders is lowered
in order to avoid a price difference that would drive the Dutch gasoline stations
close to the border out of business. Less well known is that relatively far away
from the German and Belgium borders, prices may also differ locally. Further-
more, in some regions local price wars occur while at the same time collusive
behaviour among stations is observed in other regions. Standard economic theory
can explain collusion among all stations by a repeated game argument and price
dispersion by either introducing search costs among costumers or heterogeneity
among local population densities, see e.g. Tirole ~1988!. In order to explain the
simultaneous occurrence of collusive behaviour and price wars we will apply an
evolutionary game-theoretic model, see e.g. Samuelson ~1997!, Vega-Redondo
~1996!, Young ~1998!, or the survey article by van der Laan and Tieman ~1998!.
For evolution in local interaction models see e.g. Ellison ~1993, 2000! or Eshel,
Sansone, and Shaked ~1999!.
In this paper we study local interaction of firms over time in which firms com-
pete through prices and produce heterogeneous goods that are close substitutes.
Prices are assumed to be discrete and the location of each firm remains fixed
over time. The firms are located on a torus, which is roughly speaking a two-
dimensional version of a circle with firms located equidistantly. All firms are thus
in symmetric situations, except for their location. Firms only compete with firms
in a subgroup of the population, called their neighbours. A firm’s neighbours are
all firms located in positions on the torus directly adjacent to the location of the
firm. The group of neighbours is different for each firm, although there may be
substantial overlaps between the groups of neighbours of different firms. There-
fore, each firm is indirectly linked with any other firm through a chain of firms
that are each others’ neighbours.1 Although we specify behaviour on the mi-
crolevel we study its consequences at the macrolevel. So, a link between the be-
haviour of individual firms and the behaviour of the population as a whole is
established. This approach is known in social psychology as the level of analysis
approach ~see e.g. Messick and Liebrand ~1995!!, and it has been addressed in
economics by e.g. Schelling ~1978!, Samuelson ~1997!, and Young ~1998!.
Standard economic theory assumes profit maximization and ~hyper!rationality
of the firms, i.e. all firms are able to foresee or predict ~most of! the conse-
quences of current behaviour on future payoffs and they are able to calculate the
correct equilibrium outcome given their predictive powers. In this paper we drop
1 This can be interpreted as firms levying externalities on non-neighbouring other firms, see e.g.
Ginsburgh and Keyzer ~1997! for a treatment of externalities in a general equilibrium framework.
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profit maximizing behaviour and ~hyper!rationality. Instead, we propose that the
firms follow a simple behavioural rule ~or heuristic! in updating their prices, as is
often done in the field of behavioural game theory ~see e.g. Camerer ~1997!!.
The novelty in this paper is that a simple behavioural rule is assumed that origi-
nates from experiments, both in economics ~see e.g. Offerman, Sonnemans, and
Schram ~1996!! and in social psychology ~see e.g. Messick and Liebrand ~1995!!.
This update rule is known as ‘Win Cooperate, Lose Defect’ ~WCLD!. In every
round of our model, one of the firms is given the opportunity to adjust its current
behaviour. We refer to this firm as the subject. Based upon the subject’s profits
resulting from competing with its cheapest neighbour it updates its price. Under
WCLD, that firm compares its last profit with the average profit of its neighbours
the last time they competed as the subject. If the subject’s profit lies above this
average, the firm is said to be in a ‘win’ situation, it infers that its neighbours
competed in a collusive manner and the firm responds by behaving more collu-
sive in the near future by adjusting its price upwards. If the subject’s profit falls
short of this average, it is in a ‘lose’ situation, the firm will deduct that its neigh-
bours behave more competitively and it responds by setting a more competitive
price itself, i.e., by lowering its price. Thus, WCLD inhibits reciprocal behaviour,
because competitive behaviour of the subjects neighbours is implicitly punished
by competitive behaviour of the subject. In fact, WCLD can be regarded as a
multi-agent generalization of the well know Tit-for-Tat ~TfT! update rule in the
prisoners’ dilemma, which is also reciprocal ~see e.g. Axelrod ~1987!!.
The WCLD update rule is a rule of procedural rationality2 as described by
Simon ~1976!, and it is therefore a behavioural rule according to Camerer ~1997!,
who describes such a rule as a description of actual behaviour that is driven by
empirical observations ~mostly experiments!, and charts a middle course between
over-rational equilibrium analyses and under-rational adaptive analyses. An alter-
native rationale for WCLD can be found in the literature on aspiration levels ~see
e.g. Karandikar, Mookherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo ~1998!, Palomino and Vega-
Redondo ~1999!, Rabin ~1993!, Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, and Joireman ~1997!,
Van Lange ~1997!, Thibaut and Kelley ~1959!, and Kelley and Thibaut ~1978!!.
An aspiration level, translated from game theory to price competition, is the mini-
mum profit a firm requires in order to set a certain price. How the firm updates
its price depends upon whether or not its profit falls short of its aspiration level.
The update rule WCLD results if the aspiration level is set equal to the average
profit the subject’s neighbours got the last time they played the game as subject.
The aspiration level under WCLD is thus endogenous. Whenever the subject gets
a higher profit than the reference profit of its set of neighbours, the firm will tend
2 Procedural rationality means that people think about their choices before they come to a decision.
It focusses on the process or path leading to an outcome. Substantive rationality focusses on the
outcome. It supposes that people act as utility maximizers. The common approach in economics is
substantive rationality.
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to collusion. When its profit falls short of this number, the firm will play more
competitively in the next round of play.
Our model yields a high-dimensional martingale process which has no analyti-
cal solutions in closed form. Therefore, we study the macroeconomic conse-
quences of individual behaviour at the microlevel through performing simulations
for different parameter values. We define the notion of a stable state at the ag-
gregate level as a situation in which the percentages of firms which set a certain
price is ~almost! constant over time. Interest goes out to the stable state of the
population and the path towards this stable state. Our simulations show that a
stable state always emerges, that it is unique, displays a large percentage of col-
lusive behaviour and such a state always corresponds to price dispersion. So, even
though all firms are symmetric, non-uniform prices arise. Since the notion of sta-
bility is defined on the aggregate level it does not mean that all firms stick to the
price they have set forever after. Instead even in a stable state individual firms
still change their price.3 The population is in perpetual flux and individual
changes more or less cancel each other out on the aggregate level. The simula-
tions also show that occasionally a price war occurs, during which the popula-
tion is away from the stable state. In fact, only a few local changes can cause a
local price war, which locally upsets the collusive behaviour. This war may spread
out rapidly over a large part of the population. Still, price wars in one region and
collusive behaviour somewhere else coexists. In the medium run the population
will again evolve towards the same stable state it was in before the price war
started. The results are very general, in the sense that varying the parameter val-
ues does not alter the qualitative results. So, our simulation results give an ex-
planation for the stylized facts observed in the Dutch gasoline market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the price competition
model and discusses its underlying assumptions. Section 3.1 reports the simula-
tion results in case each firm can only choose between the competitive price and
the collusive cartel price. This case is strategically equivalent to a prisoners’ di-
lemma. In section 3.2 the focus is on the simulation results for the general case
with more than two prices. This section also elaborates on the stability of the
results. Section 4 shows how a price war might start in a stable state. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
Our model is best understood if we first consider n firms located on the surface
of a circle. A firm’s location specifies this firm’s product characteristics in terms
of horizontal differentiation. We assume that the firms are evenly located over the
surface. Adjacent firms are neighbours and, thus, each firm has two neighbours.
3 Similar features emerge in models with stochastic difference equations with thresholds, see e.g.
Ermoliev, Keyzer, and Norkin ~2000! and the references therein.
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The neighbours produce competing products that are relatively close substitutes.
The surface of the circle is one-dimensional and can be represented by the inter-
val @1,n#, called a one-dimensional torus, as follows. Firm 1 is located at x 5 1,
firm 2 at x 5 2, etc. Thus, firm i, i 5 2, . . ., n 2 1, at location x 5 i has firms i 2 1
and i 1 1 as its neighbours. Firm 1 has firm 2 and n as its neighbours and, there-
fore, firm 1 and n 2 1 are the neighbours of firm n, thereby connecting the two
endpoints of the interval. Instead of considering a circle ~or one-dimensional
torus! we investigate horizontal differentiation modelled as firms located sym-
metrically on a two-dimensional surface. We can either choose the surface of a
sphere or a two dimensional torus. The latter is mathematically more convenient,
because it can be represented as the integer grid on the rectangular @1,n# 3 @1,n#
for some integer n $ 3. See Figure 1 for an illustration. We assume that each
firms’s location on the two-dimensional torus is given uniquely by a pair
x 5 ~x1,x2! with x1, x2 [ $1,. . .,n%. There is a degree of freedom in defining a firm’s
neighbours. We consider as a firm’s neighbours the eight adjacent firms in the
north, northeast, east, southeast, south, southwest, west and northwest direction.
For example the firm located at ~2,2! has ~1,1!, ~1,2!, ~1,3!, ~2,1!, ~2,3!, ~3,1!,
~3,2!, and ~3,3! as its neighbours. Similar as in the one-dimensional case, firms
with the first coordinate equal to 1 ~i.e. x1 5 1! have neighbours with first coor-
dinate equal to n ~i.e. x1 5 n! and vice versa. Also, firms with x2 5 1 have neigh-
bours with x2 5 n and vice versa. Thus, the eight neighbours of the firm located
at ~1,1! are given by ~n,n!, ~n,1!, ~n,2!, ~1,n!, ~1,2!, ~2,n!, ~2,1!, and ~2,2!. For-
mally, the eight neighbours of the firm located at x 5 ~x1,x2! are the firms on the
locations y 5 ~y1,y2!, except y 5 x, given by
$y: y1 5 ~x1 2 1!mod n, xl , ~xl 1 1!mod n, l 5 1,2%.
We imagine an economy in which each location also represents a small com-
munity ~all communities being equal! with one gasoline station. The customers
of community x either visit the gasoline station at x or go to the cheapest neigh-
bouring gasoline station ~and are assumed not to travel further!. The duopoly is
specified as follows. We assume g0 . 0, g1 . g2 . 0 and a linear demand func-
tion Di~pi, pj! 5 g0 2 g1 pi 1 g2 pj with pi the price of firm i 5 1,2 and pj the
price of its cheapest opponent j, j 5 1,2, j Þ i. A linear demand function is con-
sistent with price competition in a horizontally differentiated market with two
firms and quadratic transportation costs, see e.g. Tirole ~1988!. So, firm i’s de-
mand is declining in i’s own price, rising in its competitors j’s price and it is
more sensitive to firm i’s own price than it is to the price of its opponent. Fur-
thermore, each firm’s cost function is linear and given by Ci~qi! 5 qi, i 5 1,2,
where qi denotes firm i’s production. The profit of firm i is equal to
pi~pi , pj! 5 Di ~pi , pj! . pi 2 C~Di~pi , pj!!
5 2g1~pi!2 1 ~g0 1 g1!pi 1 g2 pi pj 2 g2 pj 2 g0,
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which is quadratic and concave in pi and linear in pj. This duopoly admits a
unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium. Denote each firm’s Nash equilibrium
price as pN and let pC . pN be the cartel price which is set by both firms when
maximizing their joint profits. In most of the simulations we have set the demand
parameters to be g0 5 20, g1 5 1 and g2 5 12 , leading to pN 5 14 and pC 5 20 12 .
We assume that the set of prices is discrete. First, we restrict attention to prices
in the interval @pN, pC# only. The reason is that whenever both firms set the same
price pi 5 pj 5 p, then the profit of firm i is decreasing in his own price pi for p
above pN and increasing in pi for p below pN. Hence, a price below pN seems
unreasonable. Furthermore, the joint profit is decreasing in p when p . pC and
increasing in p when p , pC. So, collusion on p . pC seems unreasonable as well.
Next, we choose
1
k
~pC 2 pN !. For some integer k $ 1, as the step-size of the grid
on the interval @pN, pC#. The prices are labelled from 0 to k leading to a discrete
set of k 1 1 prices. The a-th price, a 5 0, . . ., k, of firm i corresponds to
k 2 a
k
pN 1
a
k
pC and will be referred to as price a. Thus, a 5 0 and a 5 k yield
the Nash equilibrium price pN and the cartel price pC. We regard a as a measure
for collusive behaviour and we will say that price a 1 1 is more collusive than
price a.
The discrete set of prices implies that the two firms play a symmetric
~k 1 1! 3 ~k 1 1! bimatrix game in which the payoffs are determined by their Ber-
trand duopoly profits. For k 5 1 this bimatrix game reduces to a standard prison-
Figure 1 – An illustration of a part of the torus. Every circle represents a producer. The neighbours of
the producer indicated by the black circle are shaded.
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ers’ dilemma ~PD! in which the competitive price pN and the cartel price pC can
be identified as non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour respectively and pN
strictly dominates pC for each firm. Table 1 illustrates the profits in a PD for the
row-player for the parameters g0 5 20, g1 5 1 and g2 5 12 . Note that for k . 1 the
bimatrix game also possesses what we call a ‘prisoners’ dilemma structure’: The
pair of prices ~0,0! form the unique Nash equilibrium, price a, a 5 0, . . ., k 2 1,
strictly dominates price a 1 1 and the pair of prices ~k,k! maximizes the joint
profit, i.e. it is the unique symmetric Pareto-efficient outcome ~from the point of
view of the two firms!.
TABLE 1 – THE ROW-PLAYER’S TABLE OF PROFITS FOR THE CASE k 5 1.
We now introduce the dynamics of the model. Time is discrete and labelled
t 5 0, 1, 2, . . . In each period one of the firms is selected randomly with each in-
dividual firm being equally likely to be selected. The selected firm at time t is
called the subject at time t. The subject at time t competes with its cheapest neigh-
bour. This is modeled as the Bertrand duopoly in discrete prices introduced above.
At each round the price of each firm is given and determined by history. For
our purposes, we summarize the history at round t by the state st, which is de-
fined as the pair of n 3 n matrices ~A~t!,B~t!!, where the ~i,j!-th element of the
matrix A~t! and B~t! denotes the current price set by the firm at location ~i,j! at
time t, and the last profit realized by the firm at this location being the subject.
Thus, the state space is
S 5 $~A, B!uA [ $0, 1, . . ., k%n 3 $0, 1, . . ., k%n and B [R1n 3 R1n %
and ai,j~t! and bi,j~t!, respectively denote the ~i,j!-th element of A~t! and B~t!. The
population of firms starts in a given state ~A~0!,B~0!![ S at t 5 0, which is chosen
randomly in the simulations.
At each time t the subject gets the possibility to update its price, a so called
learning draw. The subject competes with its neighbour who has set the lowest
price. After the price competition at time t the subject compares its profit, la-
belled pself , with the average profit of all of its neighbours realized the last time
they played the game as the subject, labelled pnbs. For ease of discussion, in the
following we say that a firm is in a ‘win’ ~‘lose’! situation, whenever its own
profit pself is higher ~lower! than the reference profit pnbs of its neighbours. This
does not mean that firms that ‘win’ are ~in the long run! better off than firms that
Subject\
Competitor
pC pN
pC 190.1 126.8
pN 211.3 169.0
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‘lose’. Based on the comparison of the profits, the subject updates its price using
the update rule ‘Win Cooperate, Lose Defect’. Whenever the subject, say firm
~i,j!, is in a ‘win’ situation it sets its price ai,j~t 1 1! 5 ai,j~t! 1 1 if ai,j~t! , k and
sticks to its current price ai,j~t 1 1! 5 ai,j~t! if ai,j~t! 5 k. When pself , pnbs, the
subject is in a ‘lose’ situation and updates its price ai,j~t 1 1! 5 ai,j~t! 2 1 if
ai,j~t! . 0 and to ai,j~t 1 1! 5 0 if ai,j~t! 5 0. When both profits are exactly equal,
the subject will stick to the price set at round t in the next round, i.e.
ai,j~t 1 1! 5 ai,j~t!. Furthermore, bi,j~t 1 1! 5 pself . All the other firms do not up-
date their prices nor their profits, i.e. their entries in the matrices A and B remain
constant at round t.
Before analyzing this dynamic process, we first discuss the behavioural rule
WCLD. The subject that is in a ‘win’ situation can easily infer that on average
its neighbours behave more collusively. The rule WCLD implies that the subject
responds by behaving more collusive in the near future. Similarly, in a ‘lose’
situation, the subject infers that its neighbours behave more competitively and
the firm responds by setting a more competitive price itself. Hence, WCLD in-
hibits reciprocal behaviour, because competitive behaviour of the cheapest neigh-
bour is implicitly punished by competitive behaviour of the subject. WCLD is
also forgiving, because if the neighbours behave more collusively than the sub-
ject then the subject will be in a ‘win’ situation and will reward its neighbours
by setting a more collusive price itself. The behavioural rule WCLD is a gener-
alization of the well known Tit-for-Tat ~TfT! update rule in the PD ~see e.g. Ax-
elrod ~1987!!, which is also reciprocal and forgiving. This can be easily seen as
follows. Consider k 5 1, i.e. a PD, and two firms located on a circle which play
the PD of Table 1 as a repeated game according to WCLD and which both up-
date their price after each round ~which differs from our model!. Suppose that
the initial state consists of the price pN and pC for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively
and the associated profits 211.3 and 126.8, respectively. Then, if both firms up-
date simultaneously after each round, firm 1 ~firm 2! is in a ‘win’ ~‘lose’! situa-
tion after round 1 and both firms switch prices. By symmetry, they switch prices
every round, which is exactly the behaviour prescribed by the TfT rule if we
would start in the same initial state. However, in contrast to TfT, WCLD exhibits
a random component, it allows only one firm to update per round and it also
depends on the subject’s profit, i.e. on the price the subject sets itself.
The dynamics specified above constitutes a Markov chain on the state space S,
see e.g. Freidlin and Wentzell ~1984! or Van Harn and Holewijn ~1991!. The num-
ber of states in this state space is, even for a small population, ~for all practical
purposes! much too large to calculate an invariant probability measure. There-
fore, when analyzing the evolutionary process, we focus on an aggregate state
space Sx5 @0,1#k11. Element s˜ t 5 ~s˜0t , s˜1t , . . . , s˜kt ![ Sx is a vector consisting of frac-
tions s˜ it , i 5 0, 1, . . ., k, t [N, of the firms that play price i at time t. We define a
stable state ~relative to Sx! as follows.
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Definition 1 A population is in a stable state from time T on, when there ex-
ists a vector of population fractions s 5 ~s0 , s1, sk!, (i50k si 5 1 such that
us˜ it 2 siu , e, ;i, ;t . T,
where e . 0 is a fixed small simulation constant.
Note that even when the population is stable, individual firms still get the op-
portunity to update their prices according to the update rule. Thus a stable state
does not necessarily imply that all firms stick to their current prices forever. It
simply means that after a specific time T, the population fractions do not vary
more than a small amount.
A stable state is reached when for every possible price the number of firms
abandoning this price to play another one ~outflow! is equal to the number of
firms switching to this particular price ~inflow!. This criterion is known as the
perpetual flux ~PF! criterion ~see e.g. Palomino and Vega-Redondo ~1999!! mean-
ing that no fluctuation is observed at the aggregate level while individual firms
may still change their prices at the microlevel. The PF criterion holds for all
components of the stable state s and it is a reformulation of the stable state cri-
terion of a Markov chain on the state space Sx. We use this criterion on the level
of a simulation run to detect a stable state, where a simulation run is defined as
the fixed number of rounds equal to some large constant, denoted as L, times the
number of firms in the social environment ~n2!. Therefore, on average each firm
is selected to be the subject L times during one simulation run. An entire simu-
lation consists of a large number of simulation runs. The total number of rounds
in an entire simulation is equal to number of simulation runs · L · n2. Since a con-
stant average percentage of collusion, 100% · (i50k @s˜ it~t! . i#, is a necessary con-
dition for the PF criterion to hold, we implemented a check on the variation in
the average percentage of collusion between one simulation run and the next
simulation run, before the PF criterion is checked. The extra criterion is added
for reasons of calculation, so the simulation program does not check for the PF
criterion unless there is a possibility the criterion actually holds.
3 THE SIMULATION RESULTS
3.1 Price Competition as a Prisoners’ Dilemma
In this section we report results for the case of price competition with two prices,
i.e. k 5 1, and profits as reported in Table 1. We simulated the PD for n 5 30, i.e.
900 firms. For each set of parameter values, we performed 300 simulation runs,
each having L 5 50, and checked for stable states.
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Table 2 – The simulation results for k 5 1 and n 5 30
In all of our simulations the state s˜ it converges to the stable state summarized
in Table 2. This stable state is characterized by a non-uniform price and collusive
behaviour, where approximately half of the firms set the cartel price, while the
other half set the competitive Nash equilibrium price.
Varying the demand parameters did not result in qualitatively different results.
Raising the size of the torus n increases the convergence times, i.e. it takes more
time to reach a stable state. We also investigated the effect of varying the size of
the neighbourhood. We extended the number of neighbours for each firm to 24,
by considering the firms that can be reached in two steps, i.e. we take the firm’s
direct neighbours together with the firm’s neighbours’ neighbours as the set of
neighbours. We also considered the set of 48 neighbours, which consists of all
the firms that can be reached in three steps. Entending the size of the neighbour-
hood results in a higher speed of convergence to the stable state, but does not
change the stable state. The explanation of this result is postponed to the end of
section 3.2.
3.2 Competition with Multiple Prices
In this section we focus on competition with more than two prices, i.e. k $ 2. We
simulate the model with the same parameter values as described in section 3.1.
Except for variations in these parameter values, we focus attention on the influ-
ence of varying the value of the parameter k.
Surprisingly, in case k $ 6, we observe behaviour close to a stable state for a
relatively long period of time in which occasionally a price war starts, leading
the state away from the stable state, but after a short time the state returns to the
stable state just left. Therefore, we will refer to such states as quasi-stable states.
We define a quasi-stable state as a state s that satisfies definition 1, except for
recurring small periods of time. So, in the quasi-stable state s the firms behave
most of the time according to a state s˜ t very close to the state s, but every once
in a while there is a relatively short interval @t1, t2# of time in which the state s˜ t
is further away from s.4 During the latter time interval there is an increase in
competitive behaviour compared to the quasi stable state s. Therefore, we call
4 Here, notions as ‘small interval’ and ‘most of the time’ should be taken loosely. Explicit upper
and lower bounds for the time intervals @t1,t2# have not been calculated.
Price % of firms
pN
pC
49.8
50.2
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such a time interval a price war, and say that the population is in the collusive
phase when it is not involved in a price war. So, the quasi-stable state is equiva-
lent to the collusive phase.
For values 1 # k # 5 quasi-stable states and price wars do not occur and the
firms’ behaviour converges to a stable state. However, for k $ 6, we report con-
vergence to quasi-stable states and occasional price wars. For n large enough, the
price wars appear only locally. For small tori ~n , 6 approximately!, these local
effects can easily spread out over the whole population and thus cause global
instability. To avoid these effects, we chose to simulate in much larger environ-
ments, mostly with n 5 30.
We illustrate the outcome of the simulations by describing the case k 5 10,
that is the number of possible prices is 11 running from the competitive price
a 5 0 to the collusive price a 5 10. In this case there is a very quick convergence
towards a state in which most firms set the prices 8 and 9, while some firms set
prices 7 or 10 and only a few firms set a price a # 6 but none of them sets the
Nash equilibrium price a 5 0. When this state is reached, convergence towards
the ultimate quasi-stable state slows down. In the quasi-stable state firms set one
of the prices 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10. For n 5 30 the corresponding percentages of the
population playing one of these prices is shown in Table 3. So, WCLD implies
collusive behaviour with almost all mass on the top three prices. In small popu-
lations ~e.g. n 5 10! often only the prices 8 and 9 are observed in the quasi-
stable state. The convergence to these quasi-stable states takes only a short time
and it is reached within a few simulation runs.
Table 3 – The simulation results for k 5 10 and n 5 30
After the quasi-stable state is reached the firms’ behaviour stays near the state
s for a stochastic period of time, after which there is a move away from state s.
The rare state of the population s˜ t that causes this phenomenon is called a trigger
point. In section 4 we further elaborate on the trigger point. When the state s is
left, a sudden rapid increase in more competitive behaviour appears. After a short
time however, the state of the population starts to converge towards the quasi-
stable state s again. The behaviour of the firms immediately after the trigger event
really is a price war. One firm feels forced to lower its price below the ‘stable’
level and becomes the cheapest neighbour for all of its neighbours. As a conse-
Price a % of firms
6
7
8
9
10
0.4
8.7
28.2
38.5
24.2
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quence more consumers will buy its product and its neighbours will be more fre-
quently in a ‘lose’ situation when they compete with this firm. Then they also
lower their price, thereby starting a downward spiral of the prices locally which
may spread out to their neighbours, etc. After a price war has lasted for a sto-
chastic time ~longer in a small population, shorter in a large population! the af-
fected firms all get a lower profit than they used to have and by playing against
similar firms with low profits, they will more often realize a higher profit than
the average profit their neighbours realized the last time they played the game as
subject. Then firms will again begin to display more collusive behaviour. The
convergence process towards the collusive phase of the quasi-stable state has
started again. The state with low prices, which occurs at a price war, is not ~quasi-!-
stable.
Quasi-stable states occur for all values k from 6 up to 35.5 In particular the
simulations show that for increasing values of possible prices ~up to k # 35!, con-
vergence towards the quasi-stable state still evolves essentially according to the
same pattern observed for k 5 10. First, there is convergence to a state in which
most firms set one of the higher prices a ~but this state is not the quasi-stable
state! and after this initial, relatively fast convergence, convergence at a slower
rate towards the ultimate quasi-stable state takes place. For all k # 35, in the col-
lusive phase almost all firms set a high price a, corresponding to prices in the
upper quarter of the interval @pN, pC#. A few typical frequency distributions of
the prices in the quasi-stable state are reported in Appendix A. The average per-
centage of collusion in the ~quasi-!stable state, rises monotonously with k, from
50% for k 5 1 up to approximately 97% for k 5 35, as can be seen in Figure 2.
Since higher values of k can be interpreted as a weaker response of the firms to
the ‘win’ and ‘lose’ situation, we conclude that a weaker response of a firm that
updates leads to a higher ultimate degree of collusion.
Similar as reported in section 3.1 we performed comparative statics analysis
by extending the neighbourhood size to 24 and 48 neighbours. In general, for
most values of k the quasi-stable state that is reached with large neighbourhoods
slightly differs from the one that is reached with eight neighbours resulting in
somewhat less price dispersion. So, local interaction enhances price dispersion.
This result is intuitively appealing, since a wider scope for the individual firm
makes the persistence of small areas with different behaviour much more difficult
and therefore should guarantee that there is less variation in prices across the
population.
5 When the number of possible prices becomes larger than 36, the average percentage of coopera-
tion in the population does not increase further. More strikingly, there may arise equilibria in which a
lot of competitive behaviour is observed ~defect equilibria!. The sudden appearance of defect equi-
libria for values k . 35 is very surprising. The more because it only seems to be present in a setting
where producers have only a small number of neighbours they can interact with. We will work on the
explanation of this phenomenon in future research.
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Similar as reported in section 3.1 we find that the speed of convergence to-
wards the quasi-stable state rises as the size of the neighbourhood increases. This
result is in contrast with Ellison’s ~1993, 2000! result on convergence rates in
models with local interaction and Darwinian dynamics. Ellison concludes that
convergence gets slower when the size of the neighbourhood increases. A plau-
sible explanation is the following. The main effect in Ellison’s model with Dar-
winian dynamics is that a larger neighbourhood size implies that it is harder for
an exogenous mutant price to gain foothold in a population that is in equilibrium.
This effect is of lesser importance in our model, since the essential mechanism
behind our result has nothing to do with the presence of exogenous mutants. The
effect described above, that a larger neighbourhood causes a tendency towards
more homogeneous prices, seems to be more important in our model. This effect
causes the initial convergence towards a state nearby the quasi-stable state to be
swift, thus resulting in faster convergence altogether.
4 PRICE WARS EXPLAINED
As reported in section 3.2, a price war starts when the population in the quasi-
stable state reaches a trigger point. In this section we identify such a trigger point,
i.e. state, for k 5 10 and explain how it evolves into a price war. We will illus-
trate this by means of five figures of the same 3 3 4 subsection of the population.
All figures in this section represent the state space st 5 ~A~t!, B~t!! for the firms
in the subsection, which are labeled ~i, j!, i 5 1,2,3, j 5 1, . . ., 4 for convenience.
Each box represents the price ai,j~t! firm ~i, j! intends to set in the upper-left cor-
Figure 2 – The average percentage of collusion in the quasi-stable state for values of k from 1 to 35.
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ner and the profit bi,j~t! in the bottom-right corner, which is the profit firm ~i, j!
realized the last time it competed as the subject.6
Figure 3 represents the initial situation just before the trigger point might be
reached. All firms set either price 8 or 9, which is in accordance with the stable
state reported in Table 3. The subject’s profit of the interaction between the sub-
ject ~S! and the cheapest competitor ~C!, when they are both playing one of the
prices 8 or 9 is given by7
Furthermore, the initial situation of Figure 3 has 11 out of the 12 firms with
189.28 as the last profit, which can arise after they all set price 8 the last time as
the subject and all have encountered a cheapest neighbour that also set price 8.
The firms that were in a ‘win’ situation changed their price into 9. The firm at
position ~3,2! has set price 9 against price 8 of the cheapest opponent and hence
realized a profit of pself 5 183.79, which was lower than the average reference
profit of its neighbours pnbs 5 189.28 and therefore the firm dropped its price to 8.
We will now describe one particular series of random events that leads firm
~2,2! to adapt price 7, which is a price not yet present in ~this part of! the popu-
lation. First, we let the random mechanism select firm ~2,3! as the subject. The
cheapest neighbour sets a price of 9, the subject realizes a profit of pself 5 195.20
and pnbs 5 189.28. The subject is in a ‘win’ situation and therefore it updates its
price to 9. This situation is depicted in Figure 4, which is the trigger point.
6 For convenience, the figures only present rounded values of the profits. The arguments are based
upon the unrounded values.
7 Note that this is only a small part of the full 11 3 11 payoff table.
Figure 3 – The 3 3 4 subsection: The initial situation
S\C 8 9
8 189.28 195.20
9 183.79 189.91
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Next, let firm ~2,2! be selected as the subject. Its cheapest neighbour sets price
9, and the subject realizes a profit equal to pself 5 189.91 , pnbs, because
pnbs 5
7
8 · 189.28 1 18 · 195.20 5 190.02. Hence, the subject is in a ‘lose’ situation
and subsequently will change its price to 8 leading to the situation in Figure 5.
Now suppose the random mechanism selects firm ~1,3! as the subject, al-
though any of the neighbours of firm ~2,2!, except firm ~2,3!, would do. This
Figure 4 – The 3 3 4 subsection: The trigger point
Figure 5 – The 3 3 4 subsection: Firm ~2,2! adjusts to price 8
Figure 6 – The 3 3 4 subsection: Firm ~1,3! adjusts to price 8
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subject will compete against the cheapest competitor which sets price 8 ~not nec-
essarily firm ~2,2!! and will obtain a profit of 183.79. We see the subject is in a
‘lose’ situation and the firm lowers its price to 8. We have now arrived in the
situation of Figure 6.
As a last event, let the random mechanism once more select firm ~2,2! as the
subject. Its cheapest neighbour is ~1,3! which sets price 8. Therefore, firm ~2,2!
will get a profit of pself 5 189.28 , pnbs , where pnbs 5 68 · 189.28 1 18 · 195.20 1
1
8 · 183.79 5 189.33. This again puts the subject in a ‘lose’ situation and therefore
it lowers its price to 7 as depicted in Figure 7.
At this point, i.e. Figure 7, the population is no longer in a stable situation.
Instead it has entered one of the small time intervals @t1, t2#, were the local price
war will spread out to the neighbours. Since there is now one firm that sets a
price 7, other firms which compete with this firm will be in a ‘lose’ situation and
will therefore also lower their prices. The latter scenario is eight times more likely
than the event that firm ~2,2! will adjust upwards to price 8 ~i.e. the local price
war does not spread!. Therefore, it is most likely that the population as a whole
will move in the direction away from the quasi-stable state s. After some sto-
chastic time however, there will be enough firms with sufficiently low profits the
last time they were the subject to ensure that some firms as the subject will re-
alize a profit higher than the average profit of their neighbours and thus will be
in ‘win’ situation again. Then the trend away from the state s is reversed and
there is again convergence towards the same quasi-stable state s as before. The
essential feature of the trigger point is that one firm is selected twice in very
short succession, i.e. before any of its neighbours has been selected more than
once. The events as described above have a very small probability of happening,
but since there are many situations alike in which a trigger point is reached, the
overall probability of reaching a trigger point is large enough to observe the ef-
fects very clearly. Moreover, since competition is always between the subject and
its most competitive neighbour, having just one firm that sets a low price in the
neighbourhood of the subject is enough to get the subject to lower its price. This
Figure 7 – The 3 3 4 subsection: Start of a price war
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way, the specified interaction structure contributes to a large extent to the possi-
bility for the low price to spread out rapidly over ~a part of! the population.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we reported that collusive behaviour can evolve in a social envi-
ronment consisting of horizontally differentiated firms which compete locally in
prices and which follow the explicit behavioural rule WCLD. Comparative statics
reveal that our results are robust. Furthermore, the average percentage of collu-
sive behaviour increases the finer the grid of discrete prices is, which is due to a
weaker price adjustment when the grid is finer. Price dispersion and occasional
price wars coexists.
In section 4 we have argued that a specific chain of events of the random
process which selects the subject induces one of the firms to lower its price be-
low any price that is played in its neighbourhood. This can be viewed as a spon-
taneous shock to the dynamics of the model ~a so-called mutation in the termi-
nology of evolutionary game theory!, which arises endogenously in the model.
This differs with the standard evolutionary models by Young ~1993!, Young and
Foster ~1991!, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ~1993!, and Ellison ~1993, 2000! where
spontaneous mutations are exogenous features that change the outcome of the
models in an essential way.
Finally, in our model, a price war is an endogenous feature which starts at
unpredictable moments in time. These wars depend upon a change in behaviour
of only a few firms under specific circumstances, which we have clarified. The
time at which a price war starts and the time it lasts are both stochastic. Put in a
broader perspective, our results can be seen as an alternative explanation for the
bubble-crash cycles, as observed by e.g. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams ~1988!,
suggesting that it might not be mere risk aversion that generates the cycles ob-
served by these authors. The feature of price wars warrants further detailed math-
ematical study in future research.
APPENDIX
A QUASI-STABLE STATES
In this appendix several quasi-stable states are reported for k 5 9,19,29. The
top row of each table represents the possible prices a, a 5 0, . . ., k, which corre-
spond to the prices pN 1
a
k
~pC 2 pN!. The bottom row reports the percentage of
the firms that set the price a. The average percentage of collusion is reported in
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the last column, which is simply the average of the prices weighted by the per-
centage of the firms playing that price.
k 5 9:
Price a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Av.% a
% of Firms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 7.6 28.6 39.7 23.9 86.6
k 5 19:
Price a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
% of Firms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price a 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Av.% a
% of Firms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 9.1 28.6 38.3 23.2 93.4
k 5 29:
Price a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
% of Firms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price a 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
% of Firms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price a 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Av.% a
% of Firms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 9.0 28.2 38.2 24.0 95.7
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